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STUDENT NOTES
PRETRIAL DISCOVERY OF EXISTENCE AND
LIMITS OF AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
INSURANCE
The purpose and scope of this note is to analyze the ap-
parent irreconcilable conflict which exists in both state and federal
cases with respect to the discoverability of a defendant's liability
insurance policy and its limits in an action based on an automobile
accident. The cases analyzed are limited to those involving automo-
bile accidents in which the plaintiff has attempted to learn of the
existence of liability insurance through one of three techniques of
discovery as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
or similar state procedures: (1) oral deposition,1 (2) written inter-
rogatories,: and (8) orders for production and inspection of docu-
ments.s The basic rule in this area is Rule 26 (b) which provides for
the scope of examination permissible under these rules. The state
cases discussed involve those states which have adopted, either by
statute or court promulgated rules, civil procedure.4 The analysis
here is limited to the reasoning employed by both state and federal
courts in denying or allowing pretrail discovery of the existence and
limits of liability insurance in automobile negligence actions. There-
fore, the particular discovery technique employed by the plaintiff
in these cases is not significant for this purpose.
IFED. R. Cav. P. 30.
:FED. R. Crv. P. 33.
'FEz. R. Civ. P. 34.
'For example, the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned
after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. West Virginia's version of Rule 26 (b)
is substantially the same as the corresponding federal rule and provides as
follows:
Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d),
the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or
defense or any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts, except that the deponent may not be examined as to any
writing described in Rule 34(b) unless the court in which the action is
pending has ordered the production or inspection thereof upon motion of
the examining party. It is not grounds for objection that the testimony
will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action and appears reasonably
calculated, and intended in good faith, to lead to the discovery of evidence
which will be admissible at the trial.
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I.
DISCOVERY NOT ALLOWED
Since the reasons for not allowing discovery of automobile lia-
bility insurance and its limits are somewhat related, they may be
considered together. Some of the reasons advanced for refusing to
allow discovery are that discovery of such information: (1) is not
relevant to the subject matter,5 (2) is not reasonably calculated to
lead to admissible evidence, 6 (3) is irrelevant and immaterial
until such time as a judgment is returned unsatisfied,7 (4) would
give the plaintiff a strategic advantage," (5) is likely to lead to dis-
covery of other assets,9 (6) would constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure and invasion of privacy,10 and (7) is not based upon any
public policy justification." Some courts simply say the leading




The concept of relevancy to the subject matter of the litiga-
tion is a thread which binds most of the cases in this area together.
For example, in Sanders v. Ayrhart"3 the Idaho court held that under
its rules of civil procedure relevancy to the subject matter is the
basic test as to discoverability and the information concerning the
defendant's liability insurance was not relevant to the subject
matter of the action. In reaching this decision the court recognized
'E.g., Jeppeson v. Swanson, 242 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
'E.g., Roemke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D., 197 (S.D. Ill. 1918; McClure v.
Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
'E.g., Burkes v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
Old.9E.g., Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (S.D. Ill. 1958).
"E.g., Mecke v. Bahr, 177 Neb. 584, 129 N.W.2d 573 (1964). But see, People
ex rel4 Terry v. Fisher, 12 II. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
' E.g., State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1963).
'E.g., Mecke v. Bahr, 177 Neb. 584, 129 N.W.2d 573 (1964). This court
observed that the legislatures in such states (those allowing discovery) had
given an interest in such policies to every member of society who is negligently
injured. In State ex rel. Allen v. District Ct., 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999 (1952)
the court took the view that in the absence of such a statute there is no con-
tractual relationship between the plaintiff and the insurer so therefore the
policy is not discoverable. But see Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont.
1962) which casts significant doubt upon this distinction by pointing out that
the provisions of the standard automobile liability insurance policy contained
similar language.
"89 Idaho 802, 404 P.2d 589 (1965).
[Vol. 72
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that (1) discovery is not limited to facts which may be admissible
as evidence, (2) the ultimate goal of discovery is acquisition of
information which may be used in the proof or defense of an action,
and (3) the discovery rules are not intended to supply facts to the
litigant for purposes unconnected with the determination of the
issues on their merits. The court then reasoned that neither ex-
pediency nor the desirability of disposing of lawsuits without trial
could justify a court in defeating the limitations of the discovery
rules.
Related to the relevancy objection is the view that discovery
of an insurance policy and its limits would not lead to admissible
evidence at the trial. This view is taken by Brooks v. Owens-s in
which the court sustained defendant's contention that his liability
insurance was not a proper subject matter of discovery. The Florida
court observed that since such insurance was not relevant to prove
either liability for an injury or damages resulting therefrom, it
would not lead to discovery of admissible evidence. Also, a Missouri
court" has held that because certain information sought was inad-
missible in evidence and was not likely to lead to admissible evi-
dence, discovery of it was not permissible, even though the informa-
tion sought might aid the inquiring party in preparing for trial.
The case of Jeppesen v. Swanson"6 represents a bold, but un-
successful, attempt by a plaintiff to discover the existence and
limits of defendant's liability insurance. The plaintiff did not
attempt to couch his request in terms of relevancy, but rather frank-
ly admitted that the information was being sought solely for pur-
poses of evaluating the case and determining whether an out-of-
court settlement would be possible. The court however, found that
the requested information had nothing to do with the merits of
the action-being only for the purpose of placing one party in a
more strategic position than he would otherwise occupy. The court
then held that there must be some connection between the informa-
tion sought and the action itself before it becomes discoverable.
" 97 So.2d 69a (Fla. 1957).
'State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1963). In Mecke v. Bahr,
177 Neb. 584, 129 N.W.2d 573 (1964), the court was of the opinion that since
the subject matter of the litigation was the alleged negligence of the defendant,
and inasmuch as the answer to the propounded interrogatory would not show
negligence, nor was it reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, it therefore was not relevant.
"43 Minn. 547, 68 N.W2d 649 (1955).
197/0
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Taking a somewhat different approach, a Pennsylvania court17
emphasized that to allow such disclosure to enable the plaintiff
to decide upon a settlement figure would require a judicial con-
struction abridging the substantive rights of the defendant to be
secure in his papers from unreasonable searches. The court added
that until the legislature impressed automobile liability insur-
ance policies with a public interest, the content of such policies is
not the lawful matter of discovery or inspection.
Some state courts have combined the objections of relevancy
and public policy in denying discovery of defendant's insurance
policy. In Di Pietruntonio v. Superior Ct.,' s for example, the peti-
tioner was requested to answer interrogatories seeking information
as to the extent and nature of his insurance coverage. The court
sustained petitioner's objections that the information requested
was not relevant to the subject matter in issue and that the request
was contrary to the public policy of the state of not compelling
revelation of insurance coverage. Finally, a recent Montana de-
cision' 9 emphasized the public policy of protecting one against
invasion of privacy and an inquisition into one's confidential affairs
as to matters which were neither relevant nor necessary in deter-
mining any issue in litigation.
B.
Federal Cases
There is a substantial line of federal cases which holds that an
insurance policy and its limits are not discoverable in an action for
personal injuries, wrongful death, or in any other action in tort.
These courts give basically the same reasons as the state courts,
but federal courts appear more concerned in their analysis with
the scope of examination permissible under Rule 26 (b).
In Hillman v. Pennyz° a federal district court denied plaintiff's
motion to require the defendant to disclose any automobile lia-
bility insurance which he held. This court took the view that al-
though a conflict exists in the various interpretations of Rule 26 (b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the weight of reason is
"r Howell v. Spatz, 14 Pa. D. & C. 2d 295 (1958).
" 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958).
"
9State ex rel. Hersman v. District Ct., 142 Mont. 139, 381 P.2d 799 (1963).
'29 F.R.D, 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
[Vol. 72
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in favor of interpreting the rules as not contemplating disclosure
of insurance matters through discovery. The court held that such
information was not admissible at trial nor was it reasonably cal-
culated to lead to admissible evidence. A similar situation arose
in Illinois21 and the federal district court there held that the
issues to be resolved were (1) the liability of the defendant and (2)
the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Whether or not the defendant
had insurance at the time of the collision was not a question reason-
ably calculated to lead to admissible evidence on those issues.
The existence or nonexistence of libility insurance is not an evi-
dentiary matter usable at trial as it is not relevant to the subject
matter in litigation.2 Thus, it has been held that where the issue
of liability is highly contested, disclosure of insurance coverage
before trial cannot be justified.-
Another bold but unsuccessful attempt to discover a defen-
dant's insurance policy was made in Flynn v. Williams2 on the
ground that it would aid him in evaluating his claim, thereby
furthering a chance of settlement out of court. The court denied
plaintiff's motion saying that the information sought was beyond
the scope of inquiry permissible under the federal rules because it
was not relevant and could not conceivably lead to discovery of ad-
missible evidence in the present litigation. Similarly a federal dis-
trict court in Pennsylvania- held that whatever advantage the
plaintiff might gain would have no relationship to the presenta-
tion of his case at trial, and therefore would not lead to disclosure
of the kind of information contemplated by the discovery proce-
dure. Even though relief of court calendar congestion is an important
factor favoring disclosure, there is also a possibility that disclosure
of substantial insurance coverage may lead to delay in settlement.2 6
SRoembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ill. 1958).
' A federal district court in Langlois v. Allen, 30 F.R.D. 67 (D. Conn. 1962)
stated that the financial status of the defendant was not relevant in determining
the issues in an ordinary negligence action. Whether or not the defendant is
able to satisfy a judgment rendered against him has no relevance to whether anyjudgment should be rendered against him. Likewise, a federal district court
in Tennessee held that the sole issue was whether the defendant was guilty
of negligence which proximately caused the accident and the insurance policy
had no bearing on this issue. Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn.19621 Rosenberger v. Vallejo, 30 F.R.D. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
' 30 F.R.D. 66 (D Conn. 1958).
"' McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
"( Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D. N.J. 1962).
1970]
5
Winter: Pretrial Discovery of Existence and Limits of Automobile Liabilit
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1970
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Thus, the federal cases denying discovery have taken a rather
strict and narrow view of the scope of examination permissible
under rule 26 (b). These courts apparently will not permit inquiry
into any area which is not relevant to the subject matter in litiga-
tion. To be sure, this is in keeping with the spirit of the scope of
examination permissible under the discovery rules, but too often
it seems courts equate relevancy with admissibility in evidence.2 7
This is true even though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not require that the scope of inquiry be limited to only those
matters admissible in evidence.-s
II.
DiscovERY ALLowED
Those courts, both state and federal, holding that pretrial dis-
covery of insurance is permissible give somewhat unrelated rules
and reasons. In the following pages an analysis of each reason
will be given through a combined discussion of both state and
federal cases.
(1) Through enactment of state financial responsibility laws,
other state legislation, and provisions of the insurance policy it-
,self, the benefit of the policy inures to the injured party, thus
making it relevant to the subject matter and therefore discoverable.
As the result of the public policy of providing compulsory sources
of compensation for the injured party, a discoverable interest in the
policy is created.- One district court held that provisions in a policy
which allows a plaintiff to proceed against the insurer after ob-
taining a judgment against the defendant are sufficient to allow
discovery of the policy as relevant to the subject matter of the litiga-
tion. ° In Ash v. Farwell-1 , the court pointed out that an automobile
liability insurance policy is written under compulsive provisions
of the financial responsibility law, that such policy inures to the
benefit of every person negligently injured by the insured, that the
I Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Il. 1958); McNelley v. Perry, 18
F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
'FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b).
'See e.g. Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833
(1951) ; Lucas v. District Ct., 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959) ; People ex rel.
Terry v. Fisher, 12 I1. 2d 231, 145 N.E&d 588 (1957); Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D.
553 (D. Kan. 1965); Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961). But see
Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
Schwentner v. White, 199 F. Supp. 710 (D. Mont. 1961).
37 F.R.D. 553 (D. Kan. 1965).
[Vol. 72
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liability policy constitutes a contract which becomes available for
the benefit of such injured person, and that if the insurance policy
is relevant after the plaintiff prevails, it is also relevant while the
action pends. In Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, Inc.32 the
court noted that the trend of legislation, both state and federal, is
to require owners and operators of motor vehicles to obtain not
only liability insurance, but also to establish minimum require-
ments for limits of liability. From the tenor and purpose of such
legislation the court concluded that such insurance policies were
definitely relevant to the subject matter of actions resulting from
accidents covered by such policies. Some state courts have reasoned
that since the policy is taken out pursuant to compulsory features
of the financial responsibility laws, the policy inures to the benefit
of every person negligently injured by the insured just as if the
injured person were named in the policy.33
(2) The real defendant is the insurance carrier; it conducts
the defense of the action, furnishes counsel for the named defendant,
and conducts such investigation and settlement negotiations as it
deems necessary. In the same vein it is asserted that the defendant
himself should not object since he purchased the policy for self-
protection, and discovery would increase the possibility of settle-
ment within the policy limits.34 A case often cited for this pro-
position is Lucas v. District Ct.3 5 in which the court held the ex-
istence of liability insurance and the extent of coverage are relevant
to the subject matter in view of the fact that the insurance carrier
actually defends the action and must respond in damages to the
extent of its coverage after a judgement is obtained. This court
further observed that disclosure of insurance coverage is important
because if the defendant fails to notify his insurance carrier of the
pendency of the action, he may lose any claim he has against his
insurance company.3 6
12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
See Pettie v. Superior Ct., 178 Cal, App. 2d 680, 3 Cal Rptr. 267 (1960);
Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951); People ex rel.
Teny v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
See Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8 (M.D. Pa. 1967); Ellis v. Gilbert,
19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 89 (1967).
140 Colo. 510, 845 P.2d 1064 (1959).
:'See also Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961).
1970]
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(3) The existence, terms, and limits of automobile liability
insurance are relevant to the subject matter of the litigation37 An
example of the rationale of the case holding that insurance is rele-
vant to the subject matter is found in Ellis v. Gilbert38 as follows:
In considering what is the "subject matter" of a lawsuit we keep
in mind that the ultimate objective of any lawsuit is a deter-
mination of the dispute between the parties; and that the
earlier and easier this can be accomplished, with justice to
both sides, the better for all concerned. Whatever helps to attain
that objective is "relevant" to the lawsuit.
An Oregon federal district courts9 has specifically held that ques-
tions concerning the existence and limits of liability insurance are
relevant to the subject matter and that they are within the spirit
and meaning of Rule 26 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Furthermore, it has been recognized that because one of the
purposes of discovery is to encourage settlements this goal is further-
ed by allowing discovery of liability insurance and its limits. 4°
(4) If an insurance policy is relevant after a judgment is
rendered, it is relevant while the action is pending. This view was
followed in Maddox v. Grauman4 . in which the Kentucky court
stated:
If the insurance question is relevant to the subject matter
after the plaintiff prevails, why is it not relevant while the
action pends? We believe it is. An insurance contract is no
longer a secret, private, confidential arrangement between the
insurance carrier and the individual but it is an agreement
that embraces those whose person or property may be injured
by the negligent act of the insured. We conclude the answers
to the propounded questions are relevant to the subject matter
of the litigation .... 42
(5) Disclosure of insurance will facilitate the amicable settle-
ment of claims without the necessity of a trial.43 A California Ap-
3See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 822 (1967).
" 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967).
'Hurley v. Schmid, 87 F.R.D. I (D Ore. 1965),
Hill v. Greer, 30 F.R.D. 64 D. N.J. 1961),
,' 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
' Id. at 942. This same view was followed in Hurt v. Cooper, 175 F. Supp.
712 (W.D. Ky. 1959).
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pellate Court 4 has adopted the view that disclosure of liability
insurance is relevant to the subject matter of the action because it
tends to promote the efficacious disposition of negligence litiga-
tion by settlement. In Cook v. Welty 45 the court noted that it is in
the interest of the administration of justice, as well as beneficial
to the litigants, that as many actions as possible be amicably ad-
justed without trial. This court further observed that it can no
longer be doubted that information concerning liability insurance
and its extent is conducive to fair negotiations and just settlements.
The objection to this argument is that such information will
place the plaintiff in a better strategic position during the negotia-
tion process. The Alaska- court has answered this contention by
admitting, on the one hand, that such disclosure would be of
assistance to a plaintiff in determining whether to settle or
prosecute the action, but pointing out that no advantage is con-
ferred insofar as the actual trial of the issues is concerned. Especially
in cases where injuries are extensive but coverage is low, the plaintiff
may settle for a smaller sum. In such cases the interest of the ad-





From an analysis of the cases no discernable trend appears to
offer a viable solution to the irreconcilable conflict existing in
both state and federal cases in this area. In practice it would seem
that a citation of cases is useless since it is just a matter of which
side of the argument a particular court follows. In describing this
hopelessly conflicting situation one writer concludes:
This is not a healthy situation.
We pride ourselves on our system of stare decisis and the
symmetry it gives to the law with its built-in sensitivity to
changes inherent in a dynamic society. Yet the courts cannot
even start to approach uniformity on a relatively simply legal
concept involving a liability insurance contract which affects
every man, woman, and child in the United States.48
"Pettie v. Superior Ct., 178 Cal. App. 2d 680, 3 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1960).
,5 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966).
"Miller v. Harpster, 392 P.2d 21 (Alas. 1964).
"See People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
'Jenkins, Discovery of Automobile Liability Insurance Limits: Quilets of
the Law, 14 U. KAN. L. RaV. 59, 84 (1965),
1970]
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Most courts agree that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
similar state provisions should be liberally construed. Advocates
of full disclosure argue that such discovery would promote the ex-
pressed function of these rules-"to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." 49 Since such discovery
would eliminate secrets, mysteries, and surprise it would appear
to be more in harmony with the object and purpose of the rules of
civil procedure. It might even promote the disposition of claims
without trial and aid in obtaining just results in cases which are
tried."
Some hope for resolving this conflict in the near future may
exist. At least the results of the Columbia conference on the Feder-
al Rules of Civil Procedure suggest that a unifying change in the
rules should be forthcoming which will provide that "liability
insurance coverage is to be discoverable as a matter of course."'r
Larry Andrew Winter
49FED. R. Cxv. P. 1. Barron and Holtzoff state:
Knowledge as to the defendant's insurance permits a more realistic ap-
praisal of a case and undoubtedly leads to settlement of cases which other-
wise would go to trial. Since Rule 26 (b) is not in itself decisive one way
or the other on the point, these courts (those allowing discovery of insur-
ance) believe that the mandate of Rule 1 requires that construction of Rule
26 (b) which mill lead to the speedy determination of actions by settlement.
2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAaTICE AND PROCEDURE 82 (C.
Wright ed. 1961).
'Lucas v. District Ct., 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959).
It is a strange situation indeed, when under our established rules of civil
procedure we emphasize that their avowed purpose is to establish the 'truth'
and require 'full disclosure,' while at the same time we treat a policy of
liability insurance as though it is so sacrosanct that not even a court of
justice may glance at it. Confidence in the courts and in court procedure is
not enhanced by this judicial attitude. AsH v. FARWELL, 37 F.R.D. 553, 555
(D. Kan. 1965).
C hanges Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 491 (1969).
[Vol. 72
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